

CENTRE FOR JOINT WARFARE STUDIES



REVIEW OF POLICY ISSUES AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES : IMPERATIVE FOR ENHANCING DEFENCE COOPERATION

SYNODOS PAPER

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1. India with robust sustained economic growth is rapidly emerging as a regional cum global power in the decade ahead. As the nation unleashes its economic might, the armed forces need to complement the security dimension through rapid modernization and by undertaking pragmatic, comprehensive and synergized defence cooperation with friendly foreign countries (FFCs), to promote and augment the foreign policy of the country.

2. Defence Cooperation is an important tool of state craft which can effectively promote and augment the foreign policy of the nation. In the prevailing geo-politico-military environment, particularly in the Indian sub continent, IOR and Asia-Pacific Region, military diplomacy can play a very vital role in furtherance of our foreign policy. Defence cooperation in our context becomes even more significant, when viewed in light of rapidly growing belligerent neighbor like China with expansionist hegemonic designs. To retain our relevance in the security calculus in the region, it is imperative to catapult our defence

cooperation to the next level with South Asian and ASEAN countries. If planned and executed in a pragmatic comprehensive manner, defence cooperation could be exploited to leverage important political and economic decisions of FFCs to our advantage.

3. Defence Cooperation is an important instrument of foreign policy, however, its importance is undermined in our context. It is planned as a routine activity in the absence of a broad policy framework from MEA/MoD, not aligned to the overall foreign policy due to lack of institutionalized mechanism for interaction amongst the stakeholders and executed by the three services with little synergy and coordination. Thus, the huge effort invested by the Services does not obtain the required dividends towards augmenting the foreign policy of the country.

Importance of Defence Cooperation

4. Military Diplomacy. Defence Cooperation is an important tool of statecraft which can effectively promote and augment the

foreign policy of the nation. In the prevailing nebulous geo-political environment in the region, military diplomacy can play a very vital role in furtherance of our foreign policy.

5. Promote Bilateral Relations.

Defence Cooperation is an important tool to promote strong bilateral relations with FFCs. India, a rapidly emerging economic and military power is viewed by our neighbors with skepticism as a big brother, thus impacting the bilateral relations. Defence Cooperation can effectively bridge this trust deficit with our neighbors.

6. Confidence Building Measures.

Defence Cooperation can be effectively used for capacity building of FFCs, thus serve as an important confidence building measure. It would also promote better understanding of the capability, intent and psyche of these nations.

7. Retain Relevance in Security Calculus.

India is endowed with a belligerent neighbor, like China with hegemonic designs, rapidly making deep inroads into our immediate neighbors through display of economic and military might, practically encircling India with String of Pearls, rather String of Thorns. To retain our relevance in the security calculus in the region, India has to rapidly catapult our defence cooperation with FFCs to next level, before it is too late.

8. Leverage Political and Economic Decisions.

If defence cooperation is planned and executed in a pragmatic manner, it could be exploited to leverage important political and economic decisions to our advantage.

9. Cultivate Captive Export Market.

In the decade ahead, India is likely to emerge as a major military equipment exporter, particularly with major thrust on defence industry under Make in India initiative. Defence Cooperation can help in cultivating captive export market for our defence industry.

Shortcomings in the Present System

10. Absence of Policy Framework.

Defence cooperation flows out from the foreign policy of the nation. However, the broad contours of policy framework for defence cooperation are not legislated by MEA/MoD in the form of short / long term policy. Thus, the defence cooperation is planned and executed by each service as per understanding and priorities deemed fit, not guided by the foreign policy, which may not be in the best interest of the nation.

11. Lack of Synergy & Coordination Amongst Services.

The three Services are investing colossal effort in Defence Cooperation, albeit independently without coordination and synergy in the absence of appropriate tri service organisation structures and procedures. This further accentuates the problem coupled with absence of policy framework from MEA / MoD.

12. Role of HQ IDS.

IDC Dte, HQ IDS, albeit dealing with International Defence Cooperation does not play any role in coordinating and synergizing the colossal effort invested by the Services towards defence cooperation, in the absence of required mandate and inadequate organization structure.

13. IDC Dte, HQ IDS.

As per PE of HQ IDS, IDC Dte, is to be headed by a JS from MEA, under DG DIA, HQ IDS to handle defence cooperation. However, in the absence of JS (not provided by MEA for more than a decade), the Dte is headed by DACIDS, a Brig rank officer, adversely impacting efficacy of the Dte. Keeping in view the importance of Defence Cooperation, the IDC Dte was initially placed directly under CISC, on raising of HQ IDS. However, over the years, undermining the importance of the subject, the Dte has been placed under different branches of HQ IDS, now under ACIDS Tech Int, who has nothing to do with defence cooperation, thus, undermining the execution of such an important subject.

14. **Absence of Single Point Contact in Services.** In the absence of a single point contact for defence cooperation amongst the Services, MEA / MoD on several occasions is not clear whom to address the relevant correspondence / queries / issues, resulting in delay in soliciting inputs. Moreover, such an arrangement also creates communication gap amongst Services due to lack of information.

15. **Follow up Action.** In the absence of a nodal agency for defence cooperation in the Services, often there is no follow up action and accountability on issues agreed upon during bilateral talks / agreements / discussions conducted during visits by various incoming / outgoing delegations. This often leads to loss of credibility of the country, conveys lack of seriousness on the issue. Thus, need to institutionalize mechanism for follow up action.

16. **Services Representation in MEA & MoD.** Defence cooperation is a very important component of foreign policy. However, there is no Services representation in the decision making process. In the prevailing dynamic and nebulous security environment, Services perspective would provide very valuable inputs in evolving pragmatic foreign policy with FFCs. Thus, it is imperative to have Services representation in MEA and MoD at appropriate levels.

Review of Policy Issues

17. **Annual Foreign Policy Update.** The foreign policy of the country is formulated and promulgated by MEA. The prevailing dynamic world order is shaped by socio-polico-eco-security environment which is rapidly changing across the globe. The nation states are defining their foreign policy predicated purely on national interests. Thus, today there are no permanent friends or adversaries. Defence Cooperation is a very important tool of diplomacy which promotes and augments the foreign policy. The defence cooperation initiatives must flow out of the foreign policy

to obtain optimum dividends. To foster congruence, it is imperative for MEA to issue Annual Foreign Policy Update for all stake holders of defence cooperation.

18. **Funding for Defence Cooperation.** There is an inherent dichotomy in planning and execution of defence cooperation, wherein the funding is by MEA and execution by MoD. There is a need to review our policy and make funding of defence cooperation activities integral to MoD. Even the funding of training of students from FFCs under ITEC program should be done by MoD. This would simplify the procedures and obviate frequent transfer of funds from one Govt head to the other. The defence cooperation expenditure is very insignificant compared to the overall defence budget, thus such funding would not have any adverse impact. This would ensure speedy decision making as well as seamless execution of defence cooperation activities. Moreover, with our growing stature as a regional cum global power, there is a need to significantly enhance our spending on defence cooperation, which would accrue out of proportion dividends for the country as a whole.

19. **Reciprocal Arrangements for Training.** India is imparting military training to personnel from almost 60 to 70 FFCs. It would be pragmatic to forge reciprocal arrangements with countries which can offer worthwhile training to our personnel. This would strengthen bilateral relations, foster better understanding as well as afford varied exposure to the personnel of our armed forces. Such an arrangement would afford an opportunity to own officers to do courses in these countries without financial constraints, which is prohibitive today. The countries which could be considered for reciprocal arrangements are USA, UK, Japan, Australia, S Korea, Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, S Africa, France, Germany, Brazil & Spain.

20. Funds for Defence cooperation to Services. Defence Cooperation is an ongoing process, execution of projects requires time and funding over a long period. Thus, there should be a provision for each service to project requirement of funds for concrete defence cooperation projects to be undertaken over two to three years, in any specific FFC. This would ensure meaningful defence cooperation as well as facilitate formulation of short / medium term plans which could be successfully executed.

21. Instructors on Deputation to FFCs. With our growing influence in the region, India needs to consider sending officers as instructors on deputation to the Premier Military Training Institutions of FFCs, particularly in select South Asian and ASEAN countries, if accepted by the host country. We could post officers undergoing premier courses in these countries, on termination of the course, to obviate the issues of language learning in these countries. The countries which could be considered initially are Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar. We could later consider other countries like Australia, Thailand, South Korea and Philippines.

Representation of Service Officers in MoD & MEA

22. Representation of Service Officers in MoD. The Defence Cooperation is steered by MoD, albeit planned and organised by the Services. The approval for any activity to be undertaken by the services is accorded by the PIC Wing, MoD. However, the service perspective is not readily available to MoD, while taking the final decision. It is imperative that the service perspective is considered while taking any decision on defence cooperation. This could be ensured by provisioning representation of services in MoD. It would be pragmatic to have one service officer from each service, at the Director level posted to PIC Wing, MoD. These officers could readily afford Services perspective on defence

cooperation, promote synergy amongst the Services, thus strengthen the overall decision making process. In addition, the officers will be able to smoothen and synergise the interaction between MoD and Services, thus bridge the communication gap as well as improve the overall functioning. PIC Wing is also the nodal agency for defence cooperation for all Govt agencies, these officers could facilitate and ease the work pressure due to inadequate staffing.

23. Representation of Service Officers in MEA. Defence Cooperation is a very important component of foreign policy. It is imperative to dovetail the Services perspective in the foreign policy formulation as well as in the dynamic review of the policy. MEA and the Services need to work in close concert and synergy to promote and augment our foreign policy. To afford immediate Services perspective on variety of defence related issues, it is imperative that the Services officers at Colonel / equivalent rank are posted to MEA in the important territorial divisions. The presence of Services officers would also bridge the

| S No | Territorial Division | Services | | |
|------|----------------------|----------|----------|-----------|
| | | Army | Navy | Air Force |
| (a) | Southern DIV | 1 | 1 | - |
| (b) | AMS Div | - | - | 1 |
| (c) | BM Div | 1 | - | - |
| (d) | CT Division | 1 | - | - |
| (e) | East Asia Div | 1 | 1 | - |
| (f) | Eurasia Div | 1 | - | - |
| (g) | PAI Div | 1 | 1 | - |
| (h) | PP & R Div | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| (j) | EW Div | - | 1 | 1 |
| (k) | WANA Div | - | 1 | 1 |
| (l) | Northern Div | 1 | - | - |
| (m) | SM & IOR Div | - | 1 | - |
| (n) | UNP Div | 1 | - | - |
| | Total | 9 | 7 | 4 |

gap between MEA, MoD and the Services, thus promote better coordination and synergy amongst these agencies. These officers would be able to undertake other responsibilities as well, help reduce the work load and harmonise the overall functioning. Post due deliberations with MEA, Services officers are recommended to be posted to the under mentioned territorial divisions in MEA :-

24. **Provision of Officers.** The officers required to represent the Services in the MoD and MEA could be provided by the respective Service from the existing establishment, without any accretion.

25. The Services representation at the appropriate levels in MoD and MEA would afford vital Services perspective in the planning process as well as promote seamless interaction amongst the various stakeholders involved in planning and execution of defence cooperation, thus enhance its overall effectiveness.

Defence Cooperation : Role of Services Think Tanks

26. **Expanding Scope of Defence Cooperation.** India is rapidly emerging as a regional cum global power, thus the obligations to engage FFCs is increasing manifold. With our increasing influence, large number of FFCs are seeking more and more cooperation in the field of military training, which we may not be able to fulfill. It is not possible for the Armed Forces to meet the aspirations of these countries to the desired scale and scope of cooperation, without adverse impact on the training of own forces. Our veterans, through the Services Think Tanks, could play a very vital role in defence cooperation, immensely benefitting the nation as a whole.

27. **Service Think Tanks.** Each Service and HQ IDS has affiliated Think Tank, a Govt registered society. These Think Tanks are staffed with retired service officers, limited

number of serving officers who are either offset from some appointments in service HQ or undertaking Research Fellowship on study leave. The Think Tanks are controlled by the respective service through the Governing and Executive Councils headed by a designated senior appointment in the respective Service HQ. These Think Tanks are important asset, which can offer independent perspective on Service / Security related issues, to assist in policy formulation / decision making in the Services.

28. **Role of Think Tanks.** The primary role of Think Tanks is to provide unbiased perspective on strategic issues to the Service HQ as well as Govt agencies to facilitate policy formulation and decision making. However, the Think Tanks are seldom tasked, to play this vital envisaged role. The requirement of undertaking defence cooperation with large number of FFCs is increasing by the day, the Services Think Tanks role could be enhanced to include defence cooperation, thus augment the overall effort of the Services.

29. **Analysis of Security Related Issues.** The Think Tanks can play an important role by offering independent perspective on issues of their domain expertise, which could help in policy formulation / decision making, by the Services as well as the Govt. The Service HQ and MoD & MEA must task the Think Tanks to analyse important Security related issues and seek their views and prognosis, prior to policy formulation or decision making. An independent perspective on complex issues, could help in taking well informed pragmatic decisions.

30. **Domain Expert Teams.** The scale and scope of our defence cooperation with various FFCs is increasing rapidly, albeit an obligation, the Services are not able to meet their aspirations, thus, often leading to loss of credibility for the country. The Services Think Tanks can play an important role in assisting the Services by undertaking certain aspects

of defence cooperation, on behalf of Services. Each Think Tank could nominate Domain Expert Teams, comprising experts from the retired fraternity, to be identified by the respective Think Tank. These teams could visit the specific FFC for short durations, on request from these countries to achieve the desired objectives. Domain Expert Teams could be considered for conduct of training capsules, establishment of training infrastructure and offer expert advice on military matters.

31. Seminars for FFCs. Conduct security related seminars for FFCs, in conjunction with Service HQ. Each Think Tank can specialize on respective theme of interest, conduct Seminar once in two years for participants from FFCs, particularly south Asian and ASEAN countries.

32. Track-II Diplomacy : Services Think Tanks. The Services Think Tanks could play an important role in pursuing Track-II Diplomacy with FFCs. Visits of Think Tanks (which could include serving officers under Research Fellowship) could be organized to FFCs to interact with their counterparts and foster cross pollination of ideas as part of Track II Diplomacy. However, the funding for these visits needs to be supported by MoD / MEA. To ensure continuity in engaging FFCs, it would be pragmatic to affiliate a group of countries with each Think Tank. MoD & MEA should give the Govt perspective on relations with these countries and aspects to be discussed by the Think Tanks. The Think Tanks could also recommend the aspects to be pursued with these countries as part of defence cooperation.

Review of Organisational Structures

33. Ideally, the Defence Cooperation for the three Services should be **planned and executed by a Tri-Service Organisation, under HQ IDS**, with adequate representation from the Services. This would entail bringing all Services components dealing with defence cooperation under one agency under HQ IDS. However, in the prevailing circumstances,

it may not be possible to integrate the three Services organizations. Thus, it is pragmatic to assign the role of coordination and interaction with MoD and MEA on policy issues to HQ IDS, to ensure effective execution of Defence Cooperation.


34. Majority of the shortcomings enunciated above, other than Services representation in MoD & MEA, are related to **issues of coordination amongst the Services and Services interaction with MoD and MEA, which is primarily the role of HQ IDS**. The issues can be overcome by redefining the role of HQ IDS, which would entail re-organizing the existing IDC Dte and enhancing its role as a Tri-Service coordinating agency.

35. Review of Organisation Structure: HQ IDS. Apropos, IDC Dte, HQ IDS, needs to be reorganized to act as a coordinating agency, nodal agency, follow up agency and single point contact between the Services and MEA & MoD for all matters pertaining to Defence Cooperation. The organisation needs to be upgraded to IDC Wing, to play a larger role, since its present organization is incapable of carrying out the envisaged role. There is a need to create **three Territorial Divs and a Foreign Training Div** to deal with large number of FFCs on regional basis as well as bring in **organizational congruence** with other Services organizations dealing with defence cooperation. It is imperative to place the IDC Wing directly under the CISC, later under CDS, for speedy decision making and execution.


36. Provision of JS from MEA. The IDC Dte, HQ IDS is to be headed by a JS from MEA, in accordance with PE of HQ IDS. However, no JS has been posted, except for the initial years on raising of HQ IDS. In the absence of JS, DACIDS (IDC), a Brig rank officer, may not be able to effectively perform the designated role, since the Services Def Coop organisations are headed by a two star officer. It would be

prudent to post a two star rank officer, in place of JS to head the IDC Dte, the proposed reorganised IDC Wing on rotational basis.

37. IDC Dte: Present Organisation.



38. Proposed Organisation : IDC Wing (Reorganised IDC Dte).



Additional Manpower Requirement. Dir- 02, Jt Dir - 02 & Clks - 04

Option 1. Manpower from Services, (Unlikely to materialize).

Option 2. Manpower from HQ IDS - 1x Dir, 1xJt Dir & 2x Clks each from DIA & PP&FD. (Preferred Option)

39. Additional Charter of Duties. IDC Wing. The reorganized IDC Wing would have the following additional charter of duties:-

(a) Coordinate and synergise defence cooperation activities of the three Services.

(b) Ensure follow-up action on actionable points of bilateral agreements, staff talks and incoming / outgoing visits.

(c) Act as a Nodal Agency as well as Single Point Contact with MoD and MEA, amongst the Services for policy issues on Defence Cooperation.

(d) Organise yearly interaction forum on defence cooperation with MEA, MoD and all Stake holders involved in planning and executing defence cooperation

(e) Process all fresh defence cooperation cases of Services with MEA and MoD. The cases to be routed through IDC Wing by the three Services.

(f) Prepare Visit Plan for senior officers of the three Services to FFCs.

(g) Brief the outgoing dignitary on defence cooperation issues with respective FFC.

40. Location of IDC Wing. The IDC Dte is presently located in RK Puram, which is detrimental to the smooth functioning of the Dte. To effectively perform the envisaged role of defence cooperation, the IDC Wing must be located in South Block, as all other agencies dealing with it are located in South Block.

41. Processing of Cases with MEA & MoD. A copy of all the cases being processed by the Services with MoD and MEA, less routine approvals, must be endorsed to IDC Wing, to ensure that one agency in the Services, ie IDC Wing, is in picture about all the activities being undertaken by the Services.

Way Forward

42. The issues discussed in the paper reinforce the recommendations of recently concluded Task Force on India's Defence

Diplomacy, headed by Deputy NSA. In addition, the paper is focussed at functional level, recommended suitable measures to overcome the shortcomings in the present system. The recommendations may seem trivial but would have far reaching impact on improving the overall defence cooperation effectiveness. The implementation involves MoD, MEA and Services. Even though the paper has been given to HQ IDS for implementation, a directive from highest level would give the desired impetus.

43. Services Representation in MoD & MEA. The implementation could commence by incorporating Services representation in MoD and MEA as mentioned in Paras 22 & 23 above. This is one of the most important aspect, for improving the overall effectiveness of the system.

44. Re-org of IDC Dte, HQ IDS. IDC Dte be reorganised into IDC Wing at the earliest, as recommended in Para 38 above. It primarily entails reorganisation within HQ IDS, thus can be carried out expeditiously. Moreover, re-org is recommended from within the existing establishment. The IDC Dte / Wing should be headed by a two star officer in place of JS from MEA, to ensure better synergy amongst the Services. The IDC Wing must be placed directly under CISC, later under CDS for enhancing its effectiveness.

45. Relocate IDC Wing in South Block. The present location of IDC Dte in RK Puram is a major hindrance in effective functioning of the IDC Dte / Wing. It should be relocated in South Block at the earliest. The issue of accomodation could be resolved by relocating some elements of Army to Sena Bhawan and also taking up the issue with MoD for additional accommodation.

46. COSC Approval. To implement the proposal, approval of COSC is required to be obtained on the following issues :-

- (a) Ratify additional charter of IDC Wing.
- (b) Posting of a two star rank officer to head IDC Wing, in place of a JS from MEA.

Conclusion

47. India is a rapidly emerging regional cum global power, military diplomacy could be leveraged to promote strong bilateral relations with friendly countries as well as augment the foreign policy of the country. To energise the function of defence diplomacy, it is imperative to introduce the desired policy and organizational changes, at the earliest. Defency diplomacy in the current geo-strategic environment could achieve out of proportion dividends for the nation as a whole.

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