

UNDERSTANDING SPECIAL FORCES,
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STRUCTURE & ORGANISATIONAL
IMPERATIVES FOR INDIA'S SPECIAL
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UNDERSTANDING SPECIAL FORCES, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, IT'S STRUCTURE & ORGANISATIONAL IMPERATIVES FOR INDIA'S SPECIAL FORCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

“He is a fanatic, a fanatic, but nothing is ever done in this world except by fanatics” *Cecil Rhodes*

INTRODUCTION

1. Whether the modern Special Forces (SF) owe their origins to the Theban Sacred Bands, the Spartans or the Caesar's X Legion is matter of academic discussion. The fact of the matter is that the world entered the Second World War without any SF in the real sense. However, the war plunged the armed forces into the most potent and inspiring periods of military history. During the course of War, the armies dabbled in virtually every aspect of what today are described as Special Operations (SO).

2. After the Second World War, the super powers pressed into services to expand SO and SF capability. There was a keen interest in using these forces as an alternate to confronting a conventional war. In a nuclear backdrop, the conventional wars have an uncertain future, even if they are going to be any such conflicts they are going to be preceded, enjoined and finished with the heavy doze of participation by SF. The face of modern warfare will be characterized by specialized and secret missions, including assassinations, counterterrorist

raids, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, foreign troop training and counter-proliferation operations. In such conflicts where all dimensions of time, space and even virtual space or cyber space are likely to be exploited to gain moral or physical ascendancy over the adversary; the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) assumes importance.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY

“History is a symptom of our disease”

Mao Tse Tung

3. Whether history has lessons to teach is a debatable and much debated issue, however men have always sought to learn from what others did in the past. And quite often wrong lessons have been learnt for like the pronouncements of the Oracle of Delphi, the past is capable of various interpretations and is often misunderstood. Mankind seeks solutions to specific problems and as history never really repeats itself, these kinds of solutions history rarely provides. What it does offer is vast array of examples which illustrate general principles. A lesson the British thought they had learned from the Anglo-Boer War was the importance of mounted men in modern warfare, so they sent thousands of horsemen to France in 1914. The real lessons, of course, concerned the more general principles of providing mobility to army^[1].

4. The essential take away from the history of SF is that it ushered in ‘off the line’ flavor to warfare and there by added an entirely new dimension; unconventional warfare. The idea of this relatively new warfare was ***conceived by unruly, inspired, ‘boots on ground’ soldiers who boldly experimented under the tutelage of condescending hierarchy and or most frequently by their successful adoption of such innovative ideas from rival/friendly armies.***

Inspirations

5. The founder of Special Air Service (SAS), David Stirling had some kind of 'un-conventionalism' running in him from his maternal side; his uncle, Lord Lovat the Fourteenth, raised the 'Lovat Scouts' during the Second Boer War. Described by Lord Roberts as '**Half wolf and half jack rabbits**', the Lovat Scouts are credited with being the first ones to wear Ghillie Suits^[2] and later became the first sniper unit of the British Army. Lord Lovat the Fifteenth, Stirling's cousin was already serving in 4th Commando before Stirling joined 8th Commando. After serving along with the British SAS during Malayan Emergency, US Army Col 'Charlie' Beckwith created on the pattern of the SAS an elite outfit which is now known as the famous 'Delta Force'. Lt Col Ronald Reid Daly of erstwhile Rhodesia raised the famous Selous Scouts from his experiences while serving in the Rhodesian 'C Squadron' of the SAS again in Malaya.

6. Coming closer home, lesser known and utterly forgotten has been the 'Corps of Guides' raised by Lt Harry Lumsden during the British Raj. With the idea from Sir Henry Lawrence this unique '**part cavalry and part infantry**' unit whose exploits during Second Anglo Sikh War like the capture of Fort Govindghar (Fort Gobindgarh), Amritsar and its action in NWFP are the romances of India's colorful military history. But was it really Sir Henry Lawrence who came up with unique idea or was it in some where back in his memory of the French Army 'Corps des Guides' which sponsored the idea is a matter of speculation^[3]. The 'Corps des Guides' were raised as 'part cavalry and part infantry' by the French during the Battle of Borghetto in 1796.

7. The French Naval commandos, the Dutch Korps Commandotroepen and the Belgian Para Commando Brigade were all raised from the erstwhile No 10 (Inter Allied) Commando, with Norway being the only exception which did not follow suit^[4]. India also perhaps could be considered in

league with Norway since it also never utilized the expertise gained by No's 11, 12, 13 & 14 Patrols of the famous Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) which were of purely Indian troops ^[5].

Supportive Hierarchy

8. All these examples have one thing in common that though these brilliant ideas came from innovative ground soldiers but its relevance was realized by people in power and given the necessary push to ensure these magnificent elite forces are where they are now. Where would have been the SAS had Gen Alexander, C-in-C, Middle East not recognized the merit of the proposal of raising an unconventional force by Lieutenant David Stirling and thereafter introducing him to PM Winston Churchill in Cairo? So impressed was Churchill that he later quoted Byron's 'Don Juan' to describe Stirling to Field Marshal Smutts as the **'mildest manner'd man that ever scuttled ship or cut a throat** ^[6].

9. The Green Berets of US would not have been where they are now had it not been for President Kennedy recognizing the future of unconventional forces and thereby instructing the then Secretary of Defense, Robert S McNamara to re-programmemillionsofdollarsfromexistingdefenseprograms "to expand and reorient existing forces for paramilitary and sub-limited or unconventional wars such as require guerrilla fighters with special skills and foreign language fluency". Kennedy and later Lyndon Johnson sanctioned highest tally of SO during their tenure as US Presidents. Selous Scouts would not have been there had the then Chief of Rhodesian Army, Gen Peter Walls not persuaded Daly to come back from retirement and raise the elite force. There would have been no Corps of Guides had it not been for Sir Henry Lawrence patronage.

Bold Experimentation

10. The British having learnt their lessons in the Second Boer War started with employing irregular Independent Companies in 1940 for guerilla warfare^[7]. The evolution of these independent loosely formed companies to structured Commando battalions of Special Service Brigade and their metamorphosis to Layforce, Middle East Commandos and finally taking the shape of the modern Parachute Regiment, SAS and the Special Boat Service (SBS) is the result of bold experimentation's which the British undertook. For example the present British 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment owes its origins to No 2 Commando which was raised as the first airborne commando unit^[8].

11. Understanding the need and creating a unique force to meet the need resulted in raising units like the No 14 Commando (Arctic) which was raised primarily to fight the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe in order to prevent their action against the allied 'Arctic Convoys'^[9]. Similarly No 10 (InterAllied) Commando consisting of troops from entire European countries and were utilized accordingly to the theatre of operations. It's No 2 Dutch Troop was utilized as guides and pathfinders for 'Op Market Garden'^[10]. **All these units were configured, man-powered and equipped according to the designated task and area of operations.**

Inferences from History

12. *The inferences which can be drawn from the history are **threefold**:*

Firstly, *Special Forces cannot grow from an ossified, one-size-fits-all approach.*

Secondly, *SF needs to experiment, evolve, adapt and innovate continuously in order to avoid an evolutionary dead end.*

Thirdly, *the Special Forces come into their element when they are unburdened by a bureaucratic interference (1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislative reform and establishment of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) led to creation of a premier Special Operations Forces (SOF) capability in the world).*

CONCEPT & TYPE OF SPECIAL OPERATION'S (SO)

“This subject brings me to the vilest offspring of the herd mind – the odious militia. The man who enjoys marching in line and file to the strains of music falls below my contempt; he received his great brain by mistake – the spinal cord would have been amply sufficient”

Einstein

13. Land, Sea and Air elements have long been the subject of attention and military strategists of renown have delved in numerous concepts to prove their theories. SO being a relatively new subject has not garnered such indulgence like the conventional ones have, however they merit attention now as their role and employment has increased manifold in the contemporary warfare.

14. The employment of SF generally sees them being pitched against an enemy with superior conventional strength, firepower and mobility. As per common military knowledge and understanding these factors should spell disaster; however, time after time, these missions succeed.

15. There are two prominent schools of thought with regards to understanding the principles of modern SO; the British and the US. This is due to the fact that almost all European and Commonwealth nations SOF and their SO are somewhat based along the lines of the British to whom they owe their origins. The remaining countries (less communist bloc) being under the influence of the US are its derivatives.


16. The concept of US model of SO is best described by ex Commander, SOCOM, Admiral William McRaven in his 1995 book *Spec Ops – Case studies in Special Operations*, while the European model can be best understood from the writings of British academician, Maurice Tugwell ^[11].

US Concept of SO

17. Due to it being encircled by vast expanses of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans US has limited conventional threat to its homeland. This coupled with its role of being the guardian of the world makes US Armed Forces a major stake holder in country's national policies. To promulgate these policies and to defray the cost of maintaining large military force, Congress and the armed forces of US rely heavily on establishing and sustaining a combat ready SOF.

18. Admiral William McRaven reasons that in US context the SO work because they seek to reduce warfare to its simplest level and thereby limit the negative effects of chance, uncertainty and the enemy's will. McRaven's thesis of SO is based on the concept of **Relative Superiority** ^[12], the ability to overcome relative friction at relative points. According to

McRaven, relative superiority is characterised by three basic attributes. **Firstly**, relative superiority favours small forces because large forces are more susceptible to friction ('friction' is the disparity between the ideal performance of units, organizations or systems and their actual performance in real world scenarios ^[13]). **Secondly**, relative superiority must be achieved at the decisive moment in an engagement and once achieved it must be sustained throughout. **Thirdly**, if lost, relative superiority is difficult to regain. McRaven further states Relative Superiority is achieved through the application of six interdependent and synergistic principles in environments that favour SO, which are; Simplicity, Security, Repetition, Surprise, Speed and Purpose.




Reliance on SOF by USA

19. The coalition wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and the present conflict against ISIS has demonstrated that the first ones to set the stage will be the SOF. The importance given to SOF by the US can be gauged by the fact that there has been an increase in strength of SOF from 33,000 in 2011 to 75,000 SOF in 2014 with an anticipated increase of annual increase by 3-4 percent. The Base expenditure of SOCOM has quadrupled to approximately 10.4 Billion US dollars in 2014 from 2.3 Billion US dollars in 2001. US SOF is deployed to train, advice, or operate in nearly 60 percent of the countries of the planet. From October 2012 through March 2013, US and its allies were involved in 1464 SO in Afghanistan, including 167 with US or coalition forces in the lead and 85 that were unilateral ISAF operations ^[14]. The US also has undertaken considerable efforts to create a global network of Special Forces by building partner capacity with NATO partners as well as their allies in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.

British Concept of SO

20. Maurice Tugwell defines British SO as '**small-scale, clandestine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political or military objectives in support of foreign policy** ^[15].' The definition clearly spells out two major factors **firstly**, that though the force is military in nature but its utility can also be political, thus enlarging the spectrum of operations of such force. **Secondly**, the use of the term 'significant' rather than 'strategic' supports the assertion and acknowledges the reality by not tying future SO solely to the strategic level of warfare. Importantly, Tugwell further argues that SOF possess the potential for great strategic utility, however this can only be realized by military leaders and politicians who understand their potential and therefore create the opportunity for its application.



Link Between SO & Political Structure

21. As mentioned earlier, due to limited ‘invasional’ concerns for homeland security and the need to deploy forces globally, the US national policy is naturally aligned for a military solution and is therefore ‘**biased for action**’ [16]. The Republican form of government structure supports such ‘biases’ since it reduces the decision making loop as the power and authority is vested in a single person, the President who is the Supreme Commander. As armed forces are the promulgator of these policies, its lead enforcer, the US SOF is designed to be **proactive, mission oriented, suitably organized and most importantly a regionally focused establishment**.

22. In contrast Britain and commonwealth countries do not invest their authority in a single person. Such decisions of national security decisions are made by Cabinet based on advice from the National Security Committee. These decisions are characterized by the need for consensus decision-making and considering '**response options**' which are within a broader purview of national security framework. Thus in Britain 'early influence' and 'bias-for-action' assumes less relevance than the US.

23. Smaller footprints in global politics, consideration towards working of response options rather than military solutions, and a consensus based political structure with a larger decision making loop edifices the British SF on broader aspects of terrain and not a regionally focused force like the US. Since its charter of employment is diverse it is a force which is versatile and lithe and caters for 'all seasons and flavors'.

Types of SO

24. SOF operations fall broadly into two categories: direct and indirect. The direct approach consists of SO that directly target the enemy, such as operations executed by Navy SEALs to free American and Danish aid workers held by Somali pirates or neutralization of Osama Bin Laden.

25. According to Admiral McRaven:

“The direct approach is characterized by technologically-enabled small-unit precision lethality, focused intelligence, and interagency cooperation integrated on a digitally-networked battlefield.... Extreme in risk, precise in execution and able to deliver a high payoff, the impacts of the direct approach are immediate, visible to [the] public and have tremendous effects on enemies’ networks ^[17]”. Such missions are typically short and usually

carry a higher potential for the use of weapons; they tend to be more “kinetic”.

26. The Indirect approach is characterized by long-term commitments of SOF to help enable and aid other nations to improve their own military forces and security. McRaven explains:-

“The indirect approach includes empowering host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging key populations. These long-term efforts increase partner capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address local needs, and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of violent extremism” ^[18].

27. While the direct approach is focused on addressing immediate situations such as disrupting terrorist operations, the indirect approach is long term and seeks to prevent threatening situations from arising or to defuse them with the lowest investment of country’s assets. One of the way it does this is by equipping partner countries to address their own security challenges more effectively. This approach can also be a key to ending larger conflicts on favorable terms.

28. If one was to analyze the recent happenings with a larger perspective it would be evident that while Afghan and Iraq conflicts were overall more direct in nature, however, owing to its outcome, the strategy adopted by the US, UK, France and other associated countries involved in Syria and Libya has been more of empowerment of host nations. This tilt in strategy towards indirect operations has paid high dividends. **The point to be taken is that while direct operations have their own relevance and importance it is equally important to be trained in conduct of operations of indirect involvement.**

SO & ITS IMPACT ON SOF's ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

**“I heard the voice of the Lord, saying,
Whom shall I send, who will go for us?
Then said I, here am I; Send Me”**

Isaiah 6:8

Structure of US SOF

29. Keeping the US concept of SO in mind, the US SOF is structured in a three tiered force. **Type 1**, SOF undertake **VERY SPECIAL** missions. Within Type 1 there are Tier I and Tier II forces. Tier 1's USP is Counter Terrorism (CT) and Hostage Rescue, Counter Drug Operations or tasks which are more direct in action. The units of Tier 1 are 1st Special Forces Operations Detachment-D(1st SFOD or Delta Force), Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU or SEAL Team 6), 24th Special Task Squadron (24th STS) and Intelligence Support Activity (ISA).

30. **Tier II Forces** are like the Special Forces Group (SFG) or the Green Berets of the US Army, SEAL teams (less DEVGRU) of the Navy and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (160th SOAR). The Green Berets are masters of unconventional warfare, small unit tactics, infiltration, intelligence gathering, and close quarters combat. **They are mostly focused on training and advising foreign militaries, thus are oriented towards indirect operations.** Their USP is **Guerrilla Warfare**. Since SOF Tier 2 is primarily designed to train and lead foreign soldiers **they have a regional focus**. Each member tends to learn the language and culture of their assigned areas, thereby enabling him to organize, train, assist, and work with locals and indigenous forces. Their mission is **asymmetrical warfare and foreign internal defense**. In such cases they

are tasked with organizing local fighters in an effort to disrupt the enemies ability to perform ordinary Command, Control and resupply efforts. Under special circumstances they also undertake missions that include direct action raids, peace operations, counter-proliferation, counter-drug advisory roles, hostage rescue, and other strategic missions ^[19]. The SFG's are augmented by two reserve groups (19th& 20th SFG).

31. The regional focus of various SFG's is ^[20]:

<u>Insignia</u>	<u>SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (SFG)</u>
	1stSFG – located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington along with its 2 nd , 3 rd , and 4 th battalion. 1 st Battalion is forwardly deployed at Torii Station, Okinawa. The 1 st SFG is regionally focused towards the countries of the Pacific region and is often tasked by PACOM.
	3rdSFG – Located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 3 rd SFG is regionally focused towards all countries of Sub-Saharan Africa with the exception of the Eastern Horn of Africa.
	5thSFG – Located at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The 5 th SFG is regionally focused towards the countries of Middle East, Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa and is frequently tasked by CENTCOM.
	7thSFG – Located at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The 7 th SFG is regionally focused towards the countries of western hemisphere: South America, Central America, the Caribbean and North America.
	10thSFG – located at Fort Carson, Colorado along with its 2 nd , 3 rd and 4 th Battalion. The 1 st Battalion is forward deployed at Böblingen near Stuttgart, Germany. The SFG is regionally focused towards Europe, mainly Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon and Northern Africa.
	19thSFG – It is a National Guard SFG. Located at Draper, Utah. The SFG is regionally focused towards SW Asia (shared with 5th SFG), Europe (shared with 10th SFG), as well as SE Asia (shared with 1st SFG).
	20thSFG –it is a National Guard SFG. Located at in Birmingham, Alabama. The SFG is regionally focused towards Latin America South of Mexico, the waters, territories and nations of the Caribbean sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the SW Atlantic Ocean. Focus shared with 7 th SFG covering 32 countries.

32. **Type 2, SOF** are the rapidly deployable light infantry units which are the quickest to respond to a contingency. Their primary tasks include direct action, rescue operations, joint special international emergency crisis response, airfield seizure, airborne and air assault operations and search and rescue. Being a light infantry group they are also burdened with reconnaissance duties, direct action and guerrilla warfare, training local groups etc. **They primarily do direct action raids on known enemy locations.** They work in highly trained, well-disciplined light infantry platoons as a rapidly deployable strike force. The US SOF Type 2 forces consist of Ranger Battalions of 75th Ranger Regiment. **They are special as they conduct conventional operations with unconventional lines of communication, experimenting with airborne resupply, casualty evacuation, utilize animal transport and employ light artillery in their operations** ^[21].

33. **Type 3, SOF** provide the logistic support and ‘expertise’ to execute these operations which can be in form of intelligence gathering, area study/analysis, medical, nuclear, transport or even psychological operations. Civil Affairs Brigade, Sustainment Brigade, Military Information Support Group (MISB) could fall in this category.

Structure of UK SOF.

34. Owing to their wider understanding of SO, UK SOF is more lithe and versatile than their US counterparts. **Type 1**, UK SOF consists of 22 SAS (21 & 23 SAS are territorial SAS units and they do not fall under the command of Director SAS), SBS of the Navy and Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR). UK does not have a separate Type 2 SOF like the US Rangers; instead they have converted one Parachute Battalion (1st PARA) in creation of Special Forces Support Group (SMSG) along with elements of Royal Marines Commandos and RAF Regiment to provide direct support to Type 1 Force. This roughly meets the requirement of Type 2

SOF like the Rangers of US [22]. The SFSG along with Type 1 Force falls under the purview of Director SAS, the authority for controlling SOF. The Type 3 equivalent forces in UK SOF are basically in the form of rotary wing sport (Joint Special Force Aviation Wing) and communication (18 Signal Regiment).

Relationship within SOF

35. SOF is a structured organization with all agencies welded **together formally as well as informally**. **Formally**, as they are under the umbrella of a central 'controlling authority' like the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in US and Director-SAS in UK and its equivalent in other armies of the world. These controlling agencies ensure minimum interference from ground forces, provide common platform to train and assign tasks to SOF as per their role and capability. **Informally**, since '**everyone knows everyone**'; Rangers are main feeders to the SFGs (Green Berets) and they turn are the main feeders to Delta Force, similarly the SEAL's are the main feeder to the DEVGRU. In UK, The Parachute Regiment fields maximum manpower to the SAS and Royal Marines to the Special Boat Service (SBS). Thus there is an informal pecking order in the world of SOF.

THE SF INTAKE CONUNDRUM

*“There are but two powers in world, the sword and the mind,
in the long run the sword is always beaten by the mind”*

Napoleon Bonaparte

36. **Selection Conundrum** The biggest challenge for the SF is to select right people who have the bent of mind for fighting un-conventional. The glamour of SF for everyone in uniform or without needs no emphasis, besides the right people such forces tend to attract careerists who desire a stint to climb the professional ladder, adrenalin junkies who are for the fun of it and people who are inclined towards the bizarre. The selection process needs to weed out the undesirables and seek men who are motivated, of higher calling, have elasticity which begets self-confidence, men taught to act and fight with personal intelligence.

37. The difference in intake criteria of conventional and unconventional organizations is that while one requires a disciplined, dedicated professional who operates within a system of authoritarian ideology and an accepted chain of command, the other requires an independent thinking soldier. Though team work is essential component of both; however, SF can operate individually or in a group of two without directions. Both skills are not learnt as a regular soldier.

38. The requirement of SF is a dichotomy in itself, it requires dexterity, maturity and competence of an ‘old hand’ on one side and on the other it requires ‘out of the box’ thinking mind untouched by military training. It does not require great intellect to understand that conventionalism is closely related to conservatism, for its very nature is to prevent change. Thus a service volunteer whose antecedents are from an organization which propagates group cohesiveness and ‘we-are-all-in-it-together’ approach is the very antithesis which defies the ethos of a force which practices un-conventionalism

[23]. The analogy of the above two facts accentuate two derivatives; **firstly**, a portion of intake has to be from within the mainstream of armed forces for which the universally accepted criteria is that of an **‘average 29–34 years old; with at least eight years on active duty, cultural and language trained; has attended advanced-skills schools; and has at least some college education’**. This lateral absorption of Service personnel provides the maturity and experience of a serving soldier who understands the nuances of fighting a conventional war through unconventional means. **Secondly**, there is a need to have a section of the volunteers who are sans a mindset of a conventional soldier. Such volunteers provide the much required out of line thinkers from a **“wider range of people and backgrounds to choose from”**. This **‘Joe Citizen’** entry [24] was started by erstwhile Rhodesians who recruited school leaving boys as young as 18 years old directly to their SAS. The practice of Joe Citizen entry or fast tracking of SOF is now an established norm which is followed by numerous SOF like the Commando Regiment of Australia, Green Berets & SEALs of US and NZSAS of New Zealand etc.

39. Having once struck a balance of shortlisting between the serving and direct entry volunteers, the next important issue is to identify among them who are naturally gifted with a flair for following the ‘unbeaten path’ or can be ‘aligned’ to such thought process without much ado.

40. More often than not SF’s job profile which demands high physical prowess tends to be the mitigating factor for selection of volunteers and the basic essential ingredient of having a bent of mind for un-conventionalism gets missed. The only possible via media for such a varied criteria ranging from maturity, out of box thinking, battle experience to flair for un-conventionalism can be through psychologically evaluation of the volunteer candidate. It provides a balanced and near

perfect selection system of choosing the right combination of brains and brawns thereby reducing the time and effort required for selection.

41. Over the years countries have tried various methods of inculcating un-conventionalism within its forces, like the de novo raising of 4th Commando or the unique functional ethos of Israeli Army illustrate such efforts :-

Raising of No 4 Commando. *The unit was raised during Second World War from volunteers for 'Special Service' from disbanded Independent Companies (Territorial). The unique nature of the unit was that every man on reporting to the unit had to find his own quarters. No administrative personnel such as clerks and cooks were authorized on its roll. There were no cook houses and all ranks were given a daily allowance and a ration card. This arrangement meant that commandos lived on civilian rations, while the rest of the armed forces had the more plentiful military scale of rations. This approach towards raising paid off remarkably. Raids by the unit on Lofoten Islands 1941, Op Abercrombie 1942 and commando operations during Normandy Landings 1944^[25] are testimony to the fact.*

Israeli Army. *The second example is that of Israeli Army which has adopted un-conventionalism as a basic form of functioning by doing away with all tenets of a conventional soldier. They have broken all rules of a ritualistic, stereo type army. Though Israeli units can be extremely smart on ceremonial parades, there is a very little discipline in the normal sense. Officers are often called by their first names amongst their men, as amongst their colleagues; there is very little salutation; there are a lot of unshaven chins; there are no outwards signs of respect for superiors; there is no word in Hebrew for 'sir'. A soldier genuinely feels himself equal of his officer yet in battle he accepts military authority without question. Israel's Army has refuted the principle of military understanding that first class discipline in battle depends on good discipline in the barracks^[26].*

Psychological Evaluation

42. Canadian academicians, **Day, DM and Horn,B** state that SO differ from other operations since they

have a high “**degree of physical and political risk**” and their “**operating techniques, modes of employment, independence from friendly support**^[27]” tends to make them extremely risky and highly demanding both physically and mentally. In such a situation where the stress levels become extremely high it can be a defining cause between success and a failure. Therefore it is mandatory that psychological testing with regards to the suitability of volunteers for such hazardous missions forms an essential part of assessment and selection procedure.

43. Like the history of SF, the history of SO psychology is also relatively new. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the first to involve some of the top psychologists in the US and came up with psychological assessment center. Ten years later, when U.S. Army SF was created, steps were taken to use psychological assessment as part of the selection process. Over the years Army SF psychology has greatly expanded to where it now performs a multitude of services like training, organizational consultation, research, prevention and treatment of stress reactions, but all of these practices have roots in the assessment and selection of soldiers for critical tasks^[28]. While all SOF of the world (less India) has adopted psychological evaluation in their selection procedures, the US being the pioneers in the field are the masters of this process. Their system of evaluation is elaborated below.

US SF Selection & Assessment

44. In 1988 to improve the quality of SF soldiers and to reduce the expenditure of selection and training, a three-week selection course was designed which is now referred to as the **Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS)**. The assessment begins with the administration of a number of routine tests, to include the MMPI now MMPI-2 (MMPI-measure of psychopathology), and the Wonderlic Personnel Test (a measure of intelligence), immediately on the arrival of

candidates. The candidates are then put through a grueling series of tasks, all of which are designed to measure their motivation, fitness, practical intelligence, and ability to work with others under stress. They are tested both individually and in groups, and carefully designed behavioral observations are taken during each task.

45. At the end of three weeks, the psychologist reviews the psychological profiles of the candidates. Soldiers with unusual profiles, or with profiles that have historically been associated with poor performance are then individually interviewed by the psychologist, who assess each soldier's suitability for success in training and ultimately for assignment in SF. The psychologist recommends after evaluating the "**entire personality**" by not only incorporating the test scores, but the complete background and history of each individual. Finally, a board of experienced SF officers and Sergeant Majors meet to review each candidate's performance. The senior officer on the board, usually a SF Colonel, is the president of the board and the final authority. The relevant information on questionable candidates is presented by the psychologist as an advisor to the board.

46. The JFK Special Warfare Centre (JFKSWCS) a part of USSOCOM is also responsible for training soldiers in a variety of advanced skills required by SOF soldiers. These areas include Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Foreign Language Training, and various high risk training courses, such as Military Free Fall and Underwater Diving Operations. The JFKSWCS psychologist provides training instructions in cross cultural communications, target audience analysis and even stress management ^[29].

Selection of 160th SOAR

47. The current selection programme includes a complete psychological evaluation by the unit psychologist. Each candidate is fully tested and then interviewed for suitability. The results of that evaluation are presented to a board of senior leaders, and this board makes the decision on selection. Because of the high operations tempo of the 160th SOAR, **the additional role of psychologist is that he provides combat stress/battle fatigue treatment and command consultation as and when required. The psychologist of 160 SOAR is also trained to brief the pilots in survival, resistance and escape & evasion techniques** ^[30].

Ranger Assessment and Selection Program (RASP)

48. In 1994, The Regiment added the psychological assessment which is referred as RASP. The technical aspects of the assessment are similar to the one described above for SF, which includes personality testing and measures of intellectual functioning. The Regimental Deputy Commander is the board president, and the members consist of Regimental Battalion Commander, Sergeants Major and other field grade officers of the Regiment. The board evaluates each individual as a “**whole man**,” not focusing on any one particular trait. Again, the psychologist provides input to the board in the form of strengths and weaknesses of each individual, and functions only as an advisor. The board gives a recommendation on each candidate to the Regimental Commander, who makes the final determination on assignment ^[31].

IMPORTANCE OF IRREGULAR'S IN SOF

49. ***“After a series of defeat of the Britisher’s during the Second Boer War at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Colenso 1888 - 1899, men from every station in life clamored to enlist...Tens of thousands of men besieged the recruiting depots, and it was now that the famous of the Volunteer units were formed: the City of London Imperial Volunteers (CIV)... For the first time in British history the CIV included an officer of the crown, nine barristers, seven architects, two bankers, thirty civil servants, four school masters, and a ship owner.... Tom Cockrane was elected to parliament while serving in ranks. The Commanding Officer, Col Mackinnon was astonished and amused by the quality of men. Inquiring of a sentry what his profession was, he was told: “I have none, sir, but my amusement in life is archaeology’. On shipboard, he inquired about a sergeant who in rough weather was exceptionally steady on his feet, and was told that he owned a yacht...Besides the CIV, twenty two peers of the realm and 27 members of the Parliament volunteered, most of them in yeomanry.*”**

Extract from Farwell’s “Anglo-Boer war”

Concept of Citizens Army

50. The importance of reservists in SF can be best appreciated if the concept of having such a force is known. ‘Citizens Armies’ the world over have been created for different reasons, while some emphasized the homeland security the others have maintained it as a force for extension of its overseas policies. The essence is to utilize the services of civilians in whatever policy the nation tends to adopt. The reservist concept has two fold advantages, **firstly**, it brings in expertise of ‘partime soldiers’ from their chosen field of profession and, **secondly** it is a healthy mix of varied spectrum

of all social classes who are united together by their love for the nation. **Patriotism with specialization** is the underline principle which provides the niche capability to this force. This inherent specialization perhaps is not there with the regular forces since in their case **specialization is built and not inherent**. There is also a mitigating factor of reduction in cost of maintaining a regular army of equivalent numbers for the exchequer.

Irregulars & SF

51. History suggests that there exists a link between the irregulars and the SF where they too as a small group have fought differently and turned the tide of the conflicts in their favor. Contribution of irregular's in wars like the American Revolution, Irish War of Independence, Franco – Prussian War, Russian Civil War, Second Boer War, Liberation of Bangladesh; Vietnam War etc are few examples. The link between these two ideologies can be best understood from the fact that the origin of the word 'commando' a prequel to Special forces comes from the word Boer Kommandos, the 'farmer-militias' of South Africa. During the Second World War the disbanded independent territorial companies formed the first commando units of the army. The fact that irregulars have contributed immensely in the field of un-conventionalism cannot be refuted. Specialists units like 14 (Artic) Commando came into their element because majority of them were reserves and had explorers like Sir Peter Scott, David Haig Thomas and Andrew Croft who were experts in skiing, small boats and kayaking ^[32]. Similarly, LRDG famous for its exploits in the Middle East was due to expertise of Ralph Alger Bagnold the famous desert explorer leading them.

52. The common factor for the underline success of irregulars and SF has been their way of dealing with matters military which were/are in deviation to the laid down norms and procedures of uniformity. Since the very foundation of

constituting the reserves is based on exploiting their existing specialization it meets the requirement of SOF which needs specialists with minimum conventional imprints. Considering the expertise required for launching of SO could range from a plumber to a geo analyst or to a person of nuclear understanding, a **'domain specialist'** on the strength of SOF becomes critically important and increases chances of success manifold. The other requirement of SOF like any other branch is the need to have reserve elements for widening the scope of operations.

53. Due to predominant involvement of non-state actors in modern conflicts the rules of engagement have changed. Such illusive enemy requires participation of a similar non-conformist irregular to balance the equation. The irregulars optimum utility in SOF depends upon **firstly, identifying their niches** of civilian careers and taking advantage of these strong suits. **Secondly**, the reserve SOF has to be a **"purpose-driven"** force rather than simply a copy of establishing them on the lines of Infantry, Armor etc of the regular army ^[33].

54. The reservist's role SOF can be either in Type 3 or reinforcing the existing SOF capability. The variety of analysts forming part of French Special Operations Command (COS) is one example of reserves being employed as Type 3 SOF. The 150 reservists in COS comprise of senior experts are a valuable adjunct in areas ranging from Expertise Initial Theatre (EIT) to key institutions lawyers, engineers, civil engineers, and various other experts who provide much required appraisals of concerned theaters of operations ^[34]. 22nd & 23rd SAS of UK, 19th & 20th SFG of US are examples of reserves reinforcing the strength of SOF.

55. It is estimated that approximately **thirty percent of the strength of modern SOF** consists of reserves. The table shown below provides the existing reserve units in few SOF of developed countries.

Special Forces Territorials/Reservists

Country	Army	AF	Navy	SOF	Remarks
USA	19 th & 20 th SFG	193 @ & 919 Special Oper- ations Wing (SOW)	SEAL Team 17 th & 18 th Team	-	@ The 193 rd SOW is the only wing in US AF who fly & maintain the Lockheed EC-130J Commando Solo aircraft
UK	21 st & 23 rd SAS	NIL	SBS(R) SQN	63 UKSF Sig Sqn	-
Australia	5 th Sqn (5 SAS)& 2 nd Cdo Regt	-	-	-	-
France	-	-	-	150 re- serv- ists with COS.	-
India	NIL	NIL	NIL	-	PARA (TA) have no specialist role

INDIA'S SF & SO CAPABILITY

'Britons do not give personal service to the State until a war is half lost'

FI Maxse

The History of Indian SF

56. The history of Indian Special Forces revolves around raising of Parachute battalions by the British India Army and subsequently formation of **Parachute Regiment** in 1952. The Regiment's successful conduct of airborne operations and commando raids across the borders did not help the cause of taking the SO to the next level. In 1981, **Special Group (SG)** was the first of the specialized units which was raised by Director General Security (DGS) of Cabinet Secretariat (Cab Sec) for Counter Terrorist (CT) ^[35] and Anti Highjacking tasks^[36].


57. During 1971 conflict, a need for Naval component of SF was felt after experimenting with amphibious operations (OP Jackpot) where an amphibious landing was planned at Cox Bazaar (then Pakistani Naval Base, now Bangladesh). Though it did not achieve desired results but it did create a thought and in 1987 it resulted in formation of **Marine Commando's (MARCOS)** who are patterned on the lines of SEALS of USA.

58. Post assassination of the erstwhile PM, Mrs Indira Gandhi a decision to raise a force under Ministry of Home (MHA) was taken. Besides security of VVIPs it was envisaged that this newly raised force would also cater for element of CT, anti-hijacking and anti-kidnapping ^[37]. Consequently in 1984, **National Security Guard** was formed. NSG was carved out of Special Group and like its creator it too was and is manned by troops of Indian Army (IA), essentially from Parachute Regiment ^[38].

59. Formed in 2004, **GARUD's** of the Indian Air Force (IAF) are quite similar to the Royal Air Force Regiment (RAFR) of UK which was raised as a response to 'Blitzkrieg' during Second World War. Like RAFR the GARUD's primary **main aim is also to provide close defense of airfields** [40].


The Structure of the Indian SF

60. The structure of India's SF consists of special units of individual Services and units controlled by Ministry of Home Affair (MHA) and Cab Sec. Since these units are do not fall under one umbrella organization there is overlapping of their role and charter of duties. The interesting issue which merits attention is that while these units (less Service SF units) are controlled by various ministerial heads, however the feeder organization for all remains IA. The SF units of the country are [43]:-



Parachute Regiment

61. The Parachute Regiment consisting of PARA and PARA (SF) battalions is the bulwark of conducting the SO in the country. It is also the single biggest contributor to almost all specialist units like the NSG, SG, Commando Battalion of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) and PARA TA units. The Regiment has its own training Centre which gets recruits from the regional recruiting centres like remaining IA ^[44].



62. **51 & 52 Special Action Groups (SAG)** are the two sabre units of NSG, while 51 SAG specializes in CT tasks, 52 SAG is primarily for Anti Hijacking tasks. As mentioned earlier the feeder organization for both these elite operational units of NSG is the IA ^[45]. Duplicity in role of SG and NSG exists where similar tasks form the primary roles of these organizations.

63. At one time TA of IA consisted of specialist units such as, Medical Regiments, Engineers Field Park Companies,

Signal Regiments, Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME) Workshops, Coast Batteries, etc. In 1972, these specialist units were either disbanded or converted to regular army units with the exception of Infantry TA battalions. **The PARA (TA) units are organized, equipped and patterned like any other infantry TA unit and do not possess any specialization** [46].

Inter SF Relationship

64. The relationship between the SF organisations of the country depicted by diagram below is self explanatory :-



India's Security Situation & It's SO Capability

65. Gen PC Katoch outlines the present and future threat to the country and states that **“threat perceptions will continue to be dominated by the sub-conventional and relate more to non- state actors albeit conventional war under nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) backdrop will remain a possibility”**^[41]. Considering such a level of external threat and existing internal situation fraught with naxalism, terrorism, insurgencies and religious factionalism, the security situation of the country becomes extremely volatile and fragile.

66. In such a complex situation the enigma which prevails is that is that while SF does conduct SO, however, a generic SF doctrine ^[42], non existent centralized organization limits **its scope to respective Service and narrows its conduct to tactical level**. Consequently, such operations are short sighted in approach and conduct.

ORGANISATIONAL IMPERATIVES FOR INDIA'S SF IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Integrated Command & Control

67. As SO are usually multi-dimensional by nature, therefore they demand the involvement and cooperation of land, sea and air elements. Any Service SOF on standalone structure cannot match the synergetic application of the unique capabilities of each Service. Therefore, it is imperative that PARA, PARA (SF) units of IA, MARCOS, of Navy and GARUDS of IAF be integrated under a Tri-Service Command. Dilution of level of SF headquarters below Command will neither provide impetus or the leverage to control SO in theatre of operational commands.

68. Also, the integration of SF units under a single authority should reflect its multifaceted capability rather than its orientation towards Service to which it belongs. This necessity of joint nature does not stem from natural advantages of military efficiency but also from the changes in the context of global strategy which are driving civil/political requirements for more precise applications of combat power. The other factor which merits integration of our specialized units is of creating strategic utility ^[47] which leads to utility in economy of force augments inherent domain specialization and provide wide array of options and expansion of strategic choice.

Capacity Building from SF to SOF.

69. Though unconventional forces have been an important chapter in warfare for quite some time, but what has transformed is that they are now required to conduct an extremely broad range of special missions in a highly complex security environment which demands high degree of proficiency.

70. In order to accomplish these highly specialized missions, SOF must possess the capability to operate in situations which might vary from their so called traditional tasks like Unconventional/Guerilla warfare missions to genuinely new and innovative elements like Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), CI/CTRoles, Counter Drug Operations and various Peace Keeping Roles ^[48]. Therefore, it **becomes imperative that we restructure our forces to form a complete unified structure and build a true SOF capability.** For this we need to transform or create a Tri Service Type 1, (Tier I) unit from existing SF setup. The remaining portion of SF units should be reorganized as Tier II SOF which besides conducting its designated task of indirect operations also meets the Service requirement of unconventional operations. These Tier II SOF units should be based on a regional focus like the SFG's of the US. The need for specialization is a must

since equipment, training and core competency will center on it. The **Special Forces units of IA cannot remain 'generic' or have uniformity in application across entire spectrum of SO.**

Creating Tier I SOF

71. Brig Deepak Sinha describes the subtle difference between covert and clandestine ^[49]; while covert operations require highest degree of deniability and non attributability, the clandestine operations have lesser needs of this. Covert operations are generally intelligence based operations and covert operations are oriented towards SO.

72. Considering this sublime difference between clandestine and covert operations in an environment where since 1990 there have been more than fifty ethnic wars, one hundred and seventy border conflicts, two major wars involving regional and global forces ^[50] and out of one hundred and ninety six nation states, thirty having the potential for failure ^[51], the lines between such operations become blurred.

73. The underline fact of security situation is that the definition of the enemy has changed and he is not as easily identifiable as the case was earlier. He is predominantly elusive, nimble footed and possesses the capability to tilt the balance by adapting himself from waging an asymmetrical or a hybrid war to fighting elusively on a 'lone wolf' mode by operating in shadows and defying the territorial boundaries of the nation-state system. The force required to counter such an enemy has to be equally adaptable, possess multifarious capabilities, have elasticity to operate against any kind of enemy in any kind of situation, terrain or operations. Delta Force, DEVGRU or the SAS, are the examples of such Type 1 (Tier 1) force.

74. We need to create a unit which is oriented towards such tasks where it has all round capability. The other essential requirement which cannot be wished away is the capability of conducting Black Operations. Every SOF has an element which has the capability to go beyond the realm of known rules of engagement and possess niche capability of executing such operations.

Special Reconnaissance Unit.

75. Intelligence as understood in military parlance comes to an underline understanding that it is a source which supports decision making process of commanders in operations. In fast paced and radical situations in which the SO are conducted, reconnaissance and intelligence needs to be equally fast paced and real time where it can be converted into an actionable act. Conventional intelligence agencies are unlikely to meet the requirements of a force of such nature as they do not having the 'matching ability' to keep tempo with such operations.

76. The accelerated time and space of SO invariably demand that there is an exclusive reconnaissance and intelligence unit which is so trained and organized that it is capable of converting intelligence acquired either through human intelligence (HUMINT) or cyber into direct action. This is so as to reduce the lead time between gaining intelligence and acting on it. All most all SOF of the world have such a unit on its orbat, Intelligence Support Activity (ISA), the special intelligence unit of US Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC), Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR) of UK, 13th Parachute Dragoon Regiment (13 RDP) of France are few examples of special reconnaissance/intelligence unit of SOF.

77. It is mandatory for us also to develop this capability for which we need to create a Tri-Service Special Reconnaissance unit. Beside SF operators, it can also have operators from


other arms and services who have the requisite experience and orientation for such tasks.

Building Type 2 SOF.

78. Modern armies while retaining its conventional airborne (AB) capability have created a force which is a link between AB force and SF. This ‘semi SF-AB link’ fulfills the void of an operation force which has larger operatibility than small SF detachments and carries smaller footprints than a large bulky conventional AB force. Type 2 SOF, has either been created as a separate force (75th Ranger Regiment, US) or has been formed from the existing AB Forces (SFSG, UK). Some have even gone a step further by doing away entirely with conventional AB force and retaining only Type 2 SOF (Commando Regiment, Australian Defense Forces).

79. This ‘link force’ is a lithe, versatile and a flexible force which is highly potent and has the **niche capability of operating from a small team of section strength to battalion size opertability**. Due to its inherent heavy fire power ability, AB capability, specialist training, the Type 2 SOF can augment SF in execution of SO, undertake semi - special missions independently or meet the special requirements of the AB forces in conventional operations.

80. This kind of ability exists neither with the SF nor with conventional AB force. The overlapping relationship between SF, Type 2 SOF and AB is explained through the help of a Capability – Correlation diagram^[52].



81. The difference in ability of a Type 2 SOF and AB force can be further understood by analyzing the difference between Rangers and 82nd AB Division. The difference is :-

(a) **Difference Between Rangers & 82nd Division**:- 82nd AB Division is rapid deployment force which can strategically deploy within short notice, conduct AB assault and secure key objectives for follow on operations. Consisting of nearly 20,000 paratroopers with support elements, 82nd is the only self-sustaining independent division in the US Army and the largest AB force in the world. On the other hand, 75th Ranger Regiment consisting of four special light infantry units is capable of executing any special operations or light infantry missions requiring precision application of combat power in 'politically sensitive environment. To achieve this, Rangers are extremely proficient in complex operations in all kind of terrain. It specializes in AB and air assaults, mounted infiltration, complex raids and assault missions inside enemy territory. It is rapidly deployable strike force and is the largest special operations combat element in the US Army. It is equipped with special equipment, has unconventional operating techniques and multiple mode of infiltration to capture or destroy hostile forces. The Rangers fall under US SOCOM and hence are considered SOF while 82nd is a conventional regular Parachute Force.

(b) **Role & Capability of Rangers Vs 82nd AB Div.** Since Rangers fall under the purview of SOCOM they are theatre reserves and are kept centrally for specific missions like the SFG's or SEALs. They are versatile and flexible and can be employed independently or in conjunction with either SF or with ground force including 82nd AB Div. **The biggest strength of Rangers lies in their employment methodology wherein they can operate in small teams and at the same time build up to a company/battalion/**

brigade level collectively if the situation demands. On the other hand 82 AB Division is a structured conventional airborne division known for its mass elitism and can be employed enmass or is capable of shedding its brigade to ground forces for conventional grounded/AB operations. Once on ground it follows the principles of strength like any other infantry units and possess limited capability to break its strength below a company level as it is the smallest level of its independent functioning.

82. Understanding the importance of Type 2 SOF, UK too has SFSG for this role. Barring 1st PARA which is part of SFSG, the remaining three PARA Battalions (including TA Battalion), form the backbone of 16 Air Assault Brigade for conventional AB operations.

83. In our context we need to upgrade our PARA Battalions (less units required for convention AB Force) to Type 2 SOF. By doing this we will essentially be retaining AB force as a rapid deployment force (RDF) and at the same time enhancing the scope of our SO manifold.

Transforming PARA (TA) Units.

84. By employing PARA (TA) like any reserve infantry unit is perhaps gross underutilization of the potential of reserves in a specialist unit. More importantly it would also be eroding the beneficial link between reserves and wider society as **no tangible gains can accrue by creating a specialist unit without it having either a specialist role or specialists on roll.** The PARA (TA) units need to harness the volunteer ethos of specialists it requires from the society and exploit the best talent the country has to offer ^[53].

85. As mentioned earlier, there are two options for employment of reserves in SF, one would be to raise or convert the existing units to fill the vacuum of non-existent Type 3

SOF somewhat like the French or to use them as reserves for direct action roles as in US and UK.

86. In case of the first option i.e. of building Type 3 SOF, the PARA (TA) units can be a **'hub of specialists'** whose assistance could range from participation and advising for initial planning by providing area and population knowledge expertise, geo analysts for terrain analysis, intelligence gathering through human or cyber intelligence. The force could also create a hub of utility experts like policemen, plumbers, telephone operators, sewage line workers, electric line operators especially in urban scenario for CT operations. A case in point is that Selous Scouts achieved unprecedented success in CT operations by incorporating Special Branch of police representatives permanently in its fold ^[54]. The field of specialists is vast all it requires is to work out the kind of specialists which are required for augmenting the SO capability.

87. The other option is to employ reserves in augmenting the direct action role. In our case with the number of AB and SF units available it does not appear to be a very lucrative option as compared to the first choice. The aim of having reserve SOF should be to **build non existent capability rather than augmenting one already available.**

Duplicity in Role

88. Probably due to absence of a centralized controlling agency there is duplicity and mismatch in the roles of various Special Forces functioning respectively under each Service/ Ministries. This duplicity in roles leads to limiting the scope of SO as the focus is restricted to training for 'assumed tasks' which are within the comfort zones of the organization. Such an approach leads to lack of building core competency and neglecting vast areas of SO as it becomes no ones responsibility.

Role Revision for GARUD's

89. Again there are two schools of thoughts on involvement of Air Force in SOF, one being the American and the other British. The US concept is to field USAF-SOF as frontline special operatives along with Tier I SOF.

90. Besides their 'Service' related tasks of aerial deliverance, the 24th Special Tactics Squadron of the Air Force is a frontline US SOF which fields its specialized technicians consisting of Para Rescue Men (PJ), Combat Controllers (CCT's) and Special Operations Weather Tacticians (SOWT). While the CCT's are first to deploy in combat to provide Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) coverage, Direct Fire Support and Command , Control, Communication (C3) coverage, the PJ's provide emergency Medical treatment in every type of terrain and finally SOWT provide Meteorological and Environmental Intelligence to the SF Teams in combat situations ^[55].

91. As compared to the US, the British concept is a conservative one where along with retaining its primary task , the RAFR has added Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defense, Forward Air Controller (FAC), Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) and training RAF in ground defense to its role and charter. They do not field troops in frontline Type 1 force like the SAS or SBS but have contributed by fielding 40 persons to SFSG ^[56].

92. Though the GARUD's are based on the UK concept where **'static' defense of air installations is its primary role, however they are yet to diversify like the RAFR**. Considering the fact that a host of security organization already exists for guarding airfields and also an added security feature of Army's presence in close vicinity, there is a need to revisit the GARUD employability. The US concept is a viable option for consideration. It would not only be challenging role but also catapult GARUDS in direct action role.

Continuity for Specialization

93. Units like SG and NSG which are principally employed for anti-hijacking, anti-kidnapping and associated operations is manned by IA cadres. These cadres have limited tenure and are not the permanent incumbents of the organisation. The only logic to such an adhoc arrangement could possibly be the urgency of establishing this organisation on war footing after the assassination of the then PM. These arrangements were temporary but continue till date.

94. These elite units rank and file have no prior experience and training of the task at hand. And if at all they gain expertise during the course of their tenure it gets wasted once they are posted out. This induction-training-rotation cycle leads to a stunted professional growth of the organization which is of national importance. Such units need continuity and experience to evolve for which they need to be organized on more permanent lines. A que can be taken from Special Activity Division of the CIA (USA) which draws its strength by permanently absorbing ex special operators from elite units like Delta Force, SEALs etc. This neat arrangement provides continuity, skill and experience to organisations conducting such highly skilled operations.

Operational Research & Innovation's.

95. Special Forces need to experiment, evolve, adapt and innovate continuously in order to avoid evolutionary dead end. Since their requirement is different, these adaptations and innovations need to be carried within the organisation by experienced SF Operatives. The research and innovations could range from evaluation and development of new operating techniques, weapons, equipment and even restructuring of organization. For fructification and to bring out an end product, the setup has to be directly linked to defense technicians and scientists who carry forward and give shape to their ideas.

Operations Research Wing of 22 SAS is such an example and its innovation of 'flash bangs' or 'stun grenades' revolutionized the concept of hostage rescue strategy.

96. This setup needs to be part of SOF setup rather than being vice versa where SOF operatives getting positioned in a research organization. This is primarily to carry the research at the doorsteps and reduce the gestation period accruing due to lengthy trials and evaluation and ensuring mid course corrections.

CONCLUSION

97. The 21st Century has ushered in revolution in warfare just like the previous ones brought in mobility and firepower. The revolution is in '**fighting unconventional - fighting different**'. Realizing the potential of this emerging face of modern warfare, countries like US have gone to an extent of creating a Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) for promoting unconventional culture. JSOU conducts under graduate and post graduate courses in research and teachings of science and art of SO where the essence is to train for **certainty but educate for uncertainty**.

98. Special troops cannot win wars, not in the military sense. However, these forces can certainly keep their enemies from winning; they endeavor to wear them down, annoy them, exasperate them to an extent where they loose the will to fight, as Winston Churchill said, "**The war will be ended by the exhaustion of nations will rather than the victories of armies.**"

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